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The Best Interest Of The Child
And The Law
Christian Reichel Van Deusen*
The laws in this country have their genesis in the English common
law. The various proceedings and writs allowed under the common
law found their way to this country with the early settlers and be-
came the basis for American law. One element of our legal heritage
directly involves children's rights.
I. Introduction
Under common law, parents were allowed to indenture' their chil-
dren-most often for the purpose of an apprenticeship-and the
wages that were earned by the child belonged to the parent. Inden-
tures into servitude traditionally were for the period of minority, in
effect placing the child into slavery until the age of twenty-one.
The concept of indenture of children prevailed in this country until
about the same time as the enactment of the Emancipation Act that
freed the slaves of the South.2 From that time forward what has
been a prevalent attitude towards children still exists: that children
* J.D., 1973, Pepperdine University School of Law School. Mr. Van Deusen is
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1. The word "indenture" is derived from a parchment that used to be prepared
with a scoured or indented line through the middle to separate the two sides of the
document, one to be given to each party. WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED
DICTIONARY 928 (2d ed. 1983). The same document was used when there was a bail-
ment of chattel or a granting of a deed to real property. The term has lost its meaning
because documents, both under the common law and in the American jurisdictions, no
longer have the indented parchment or document that delineates the various rights of
the parties.
2. President Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation on January
1, 1863, after several preliminary proclamations. The Emancipation Proclamation de-
clared freedom for all slaves in areas still involved in rebellion. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
AMERICAN HISTORY 283-84 (R. Morris Bicentennial ed. 1976).
are a chattel over which the parents have the absolute right to pos-
session.3 It was not until well into the twentieth century that the law
recognized that children were people, not chattels, and as people they
shared constitutional rights.4 In turn, children were entitled to the
protection of the state and to services designed to help them when
parental care, control, and assistance were not available or were be-
yond parental capacity. Finally in the late twenties and early thirties
of this century, governmental entities dared to interfere in this abso-
lute right to the possession of children by their parents.5
We look with amazement at the late twenties and early thirties
and the abuse of child labor in the sweatshops of the industrialized
East of this country where, for pennies, children were made to work
eight, ten and twelve hours a day.6 Why did it take decades before
society would interfere, before government would enact laws to pre-
vent this abuse of children? These children were for the most part
illiterate, with no opportunity to go to school. The gains of their
earnings and their labor often were paid directly over to their par-
ents. Those abuses, however, did serve a purpose, for they caused an
awareness and a recognition of the fact that children were being un-
dereducated, underfed, and treated as possessory chattel. That
awareness caused the enactment of child labor laws to prevent the
exploitation of children in industry.7 Except for cases where the en-
terprise was a family operation and children participated mostly in
farming, children were forbidden to be employed.
Shortly after these movements gained momentum, various legisla-
tures passed the first child welfare acts providing services for chil-
dren.8 During the Depression, many parents simply turned their
3. Early American common law, based on the English common law, recognized a
father's proprietary interest in his child's labor. See Messina, Corporal Punishment v.
Classroom Discipline: A Case of Mistaken Identity, 34 LOY. L. REV. 35, 37 (1988).4. Children are precluded from some constitutional privileges because of age and
the traditional assessment that maturity is required for decision making. Roche, Child-
hood and Its Environment- The Implication For Children's Rights, 34 Loy. L. REV. 5,
12-15 (1988). The United States Supreme Court first provided due process protection
to minors in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), and has increased such rights since then.
5. The parental right to possession of a child springs from the concept that
parenting is a fundamental right and will not be interfered with except in extreme
cases. See In re Carmaleta B., 21 Cal. 3d 482, 489, 579 P.2d 514, 518, 146 Cal. Rptr. 623,
627 (1978).
6. In 1912, Massachusetts adopted the first minimum wage law in the United
States, Which established a commission to decide wage rates for women and children.
This law was invalidated by the United States Supreme Court in Adkins v. Children's
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
7. In 1936 for instance, the Walsh-Hardy Government Contracts Act barred labor
on government contracts by boys under sixteen and girls under eighteen. ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 2, at 419.
8. Congress passed laws that protect handicapped children and provide services
for children in crisis. Many states followed suit. See Soler, An Introduction To Chil-
dren 's Rights, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1988, at 52.
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children over to orphanages that would then place the children for
adoption with anyone in a position to provide food, shelter, and cloth-
ing. There was no determination made as to whether these people
would be suitable parents. In particular, no determination was made
whether the adoptive parents had criminal records. The phrase
"child abuse" was unknown in those days. As a consequence, many
orphanages were emptied by putting children on what was called the
"orphan train." Along the way, children were dropped off in farming
communities for the purpose of merely providing another pair of
hands and another working member to contribute to the income or
the "assets" of a family.9
Ultimately, enactment of child protective services stemmed from a
recognition that in many communities and families, what was consid-
ered reasonable discipline was, in fact, child abuse.' 0 Those services
have been in place for only about twenty or thirty years now; the
same abusive type of treatment has been inflicted on children for
centuries." It is only with time that our social standards have come
to the point where we recognize that reasonable discipline, unreason-
able discipline, sexual abuse, and emotional abuse of children exists.
It took decades before the judicial system took cognizance of the
fact that a child was entitled to have his or her best interests pro-
tected by a court of law. It was a tremendous hurdle to overcome.
Invariably, the judicial system found itself balancing the possessory
interests of parents in their child with the best interests of the
child.12
The term "the best interests of the child"' is a rather nebulous
and ill-defined standard that opens a plethora of considerations.
9. "Trainloads of East Coast children were shipped to western farms, without the
formality of indenture. It was thought that these families could provide the 'moral dis-
infections' that the children needed from their immigrant family influences." FOSTER
CHILDREN IN THE COURTS 452 (1983).
10. See Messina, supra note 3.
11. 5 SPINETTA & RIGLER, The Child-Abusing Parent" A Psychological Review, in
TRAUMATIC ABUSE AND NEGLECT OF CHILDREN AT HOME 117 (1980).
12. The paramount purpose underlying dependency proceedings is the protection
of the child. See In re Kerry 0., 210 Cal. App. 3d 326, 333, 258 Cal. Rptr. 448, 453
(1989); In re Nicole B., 93 Cal. App. 3d 874, 879, 155 Cal. Rptr. 916, 918 (1979); In re
Michael S., 127 Cal. App. 3d 348, 359, 179 Cal. Rptr. 546, 552 (1981) ("The parents do
not represent a competing interest...").
13. Implicit in the phrase "the best interests of the child" is a consideration of all
options and the selection of the alternative that best serves the child. The selection of
an alternative that is not in the best interests of the child would be detrimental to the
child because it contravenes the very terminology used. For instance, if one were to
put a child into an alternative placement that is not in the best interest of the child,
There have been many attempts by courts, not only in California but
in other jurisdictions, to attach to that standard some definitive, con-
crete, and objective terms. Those efforts have failed, for the most
part, differing even from case to case.14 There is still no concrete or
definitive standard to which a judge can look when the court must
consider the best interests of the child. The elements of evidence
vary from case to case, and ultimately the one concrete element that
does exist is that which serves the interests of the child best.
II. Legislating the Best Interest of the Child
The progress of children's rights remained slow, even as the courts
became enlightened and legislators became sensitive to the issue.
The intrusion of the state, Via the courts, into the family was hesitant
and occurred only in the most serious circumstances. In the juvenile
court system, not only do courts require a finding that a parent is
"unfit" before intervening, that finding must be by clear and convinc-
ing evidence.15
The law, still treating children as chattel, tipped the scales drasti-
cally in favor of parental rights and, all too often, the child would
suffer the consequences. The "unfit" standard itself is a very restric-
tive and narrow criteria which limits the court's examination to a
consideration of only the individual parent.
The extremes that have been reached border on the insane. In one
case where a court was to terminate a father's parental rights, it was
presented with the fact that the father had murdered the mother of
the children. Yet the court left his rights intact because he did not
when there is a better alternative available, the court system would then be acting to
the detriment of the child.
One of the earliest cases to consider the best interests of the child was Stateex rel
Paine v. Paine, 32 Tenn. (4 Hum.) 523 (1843). The court recognized its discretion to act
in the child's interest even though the strict letter of the law might dictate otherwise.
14. In one section of the California Civil Code, the legislature mandates that:
Consideration of the best interests of the child shall include, but not be lim-
ited to, an assessment of the child's age, the extent of bonding with the pro-
spective adoptive parent or parents, the extent of bonding or the potential to
bond with the natural parent or parents, and the ability of the natural parent
or parents to provide adequate and proper care and guidance to the child.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 226(a) (West Supp. 1991). See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017: "The
court, in making the determination, may consider all relevant evidence, including the
efforts made by the father to obtain custody, the age and prior placement of the child,
and the effects of a change of placement of the child." CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017(d)(2)
(West Supp. 1991).
15. "A majority of the States have concluded that a 'clear and convincing evidence'
standard of proof strikes a fair balance between the rights of the natural parents and
the State's legitimate concerns." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982). See also
California Supreme Court Survey, A Review of Decisions, December 1980-February
1981, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1111, 1178 (1981); Comment, Dependency Proceedings:
What Standard of Proof? An Argument Against the Standard of "Clear and Convinc-
ing", 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1155 (1977).
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commit the murder in the children's presence!16 There are also cases
where the courts have removed only one of a number of children
from parental custody as a result of battery, sexual abuse, or ne-
glect.17 Since the parent targeted his or her abuse at only one child,
the law would not deprive the parent of the custody and control (pos-
session) of his or her other children.
California recently remedied such incongruities by amendments to
the Welfare and Institutions Code which specify that a judge must
consider the parent's treatment of siblings.' 8 Indeed, abuse or moles-
tation of one child,, by statute, is grounds for removal of other chil-
dren, provided the court finds that there is a substantial risk of harm
or detriment to the child.19
In 1969, California enacted the Family Law Act2O and revised the
16. In re James M., 65 Cal. App. 3d 254, 135 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1976). The father was
convicted of second degree murder for stabbing his ex-wife to death There was a se-
ries of incidents that led the court to view the stabbing as a crime of passion. The
court found that second degree murder was not "necessarily among" crimes of such
depravity as to bring the child into the custody of the court. I& at 266, 135 Cal. Rptr.
at 229. Using the best interests of the child test, the court affirmed the father's contin-
uing parental rights. Id at 267, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 229.
17. See, e.g., In re Jeannette S., 94 Cal. App. 3d 52, 156 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1979).
18. As one court explained:
Prior to 1989, [California] Welfare and Institution Code section 300 did not
specify sibling abuse as a ground for declaring a child a dependent of the juve-
nile court. Nonetheless, case law upheld petitions seeking to declare children
dependents on this basis. "Sibling petitions have been accepted for many years
in this jurisdiction and others. The state may intervene to protect a minor
when the minor's sibling has been mistreated."
In re Jason L., 2 Cal. App. 3d 1206, 1215, 272 Cal. Rptr. 316, 321 (1990) (quoting In re
Dorothy I., 162 Cal. App. 3d 1154, 1157, 209 Cal Rptr. 5, 6 (1984), and citing In re
Michael S., 127 Cal. App. 3d 348, 179 Cal. Rptr. 546 (1981); In re Edward C., 126 Cal.
App. 3d 193, 178 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1981); In re Jeannie Q., 32 Cal. App. 3d 288, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 646 (1973)).
Effective January 1, 1989, the Legislature added subdivision (j) to section 300. 1987
Cal. Legis. Serv. 678 (West). Subdivision (j) states that a minor may be declared a de-
pendent if: "[t]he minor's sibling has been abused or neglected... and there is substan-
tial risk that the minor will be abused or neglected." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 300(j) (West Supp. 1991). Further, subdivision (d) allows the juvenile court to exer-
cise jurisdiction where "[tihe minor has been sexually abused, or there is a substantial
risk that the minor will be sexually abused." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(d) (West
Supp. 1991).
19. The Code states:
The court shall consider the circumstances surrounding the abuse or neglect
of the sibling, the age and gender of each child, the nature of the abuse or
neglect of the sibling, the mental condition of the parent or guardian, and any
other factors the court considers probative in determining whether there is a
substantial risk to the minor.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(j) (West Supp. 1991). See supra note 18.
20. CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 4000-5004 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
procedures and standards for resolving custody issues.2 1 The statute
eliminated the terms "fit" or "unfit", and set the criteria for custody
determinations as the detriment and best interest standard. Conse-
quently, the Act provided courts with a much broader consideration
of the type of environment in which a child is reared. Under the un-
fit parent standard, for example, the courts were largely restricted to
court review of parental capabilities as affected by such matters as
drug or alcohol abuse and psychological difficulties that could cause
an individual to be prone to molest or abuse children.22 Under the
detriment standard, a parent can be completely fit to care for a child,
and yet, if the parent associates with others in the environment who
are prone to endanger a child, then that factor can be considered.23
Other factors such as prenatal abuse of an unborn child may be con-
sidered as well under the detriment standard.
The new statute requires the court to make a determination of cus-
todial placements in a specific order of priorities.24 In order to place
a child in the custody of a non-parent, the court would have to find
that placing custody with the parent would be detrimental to the
child and that placement with the non-parent would serve the best
interest of the child.25 This dual standard, however, is not applicable
in a divorce situation, where the court considers only the best inter-
ests of the child.26
21. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1991).
22. CAL. CIv. CODE § 232(a)(3), (4) (West Supp. 1991); CAL. Civ. CODE § 4608 (West
Supp. 1991). See Michael U. v. Jamie B., 39 Cal. 3d 787, 705 P.2d 362, 218 Cal. Rptr. 39
(1985).
23. See, e.g., In re Gonzales, 116 Cal. App. 3d 556, 172 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1981) (the
court may consider the impact from cohabitation where there is compelling evidence
that cohabitation with another has a significant impact on the welfare of the child).
24. According to California Civil Code § 4600, custody should be awarded accord-
ing to the following preference:
(1) To both parents or to either parent;
(2) To the home where the child has been living, if it is a "wholesome and stable
environment";
(3) To any other person "deemed suitable by the court."
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(b)(1-3) (West Supp. 1991).
25. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(c) (West Supp. 1991) states:
Before the court makes any order awarding custody to a person or persons
other than a parent without the consent of the parents, it shall make a finding
that an award of custody to a parent would be detrimental to the child and
the award to a nonparent is required to serve the best interests of the child.
Id.
26. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4608 (West Supp. 1991) enumerates the best interest consid-
erations as follows:
(a) The health, safety, and welfare of the child.
(b) Any history of abuse by one parent against the child or against the other
parent. As a prerequisite to the consideration of allegations of abuse, the
court may require substantial independent corroboration including, but not
limited to, written reports by law enforcement agencies, child protective serv-
ices or other social welfare agencies, courts, medical facilities, or other public
agencies or private nonprofit organizations providing services to victims of
[Vol. 18: 417, 1991] The Best Interest
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III. THE DUAL STANDARD OF BEST INTERESTS AND DETRIMENT
The California Supreme Court broadened the application of this
new dual standard of the best interests of the child and detriment to
the child in In re B.G.27 The court found that this dual standard ap-
plied in all custody proceedings. 28 This broad and sweeping applica-
tion of the detriment and best interests standards created substantial
controversy. The preamble of the Family Law Act requires the court
to follow the criteria as set out in section 4600 of the California Civil
Code between parents who are in the process of separating or ob-
taining a divorce.29 After In re B.G., the detriment standard was ap-
plied in all termination proceedings, all Juvenile Court proceedings,
and subsequently even in putative father cases.3s The controversy as
to the applicability of the detriment standard to putative fathers was
heightened further by the California court's decision in Michael U. v.
Jamie B., wherein the court was sharply divided.31 This controversy
ultimately resulted in a further amendment to the California Civil
Code titled the Uniform Parentage Act.3 2 When a putative father
seeks to intervene in an adoption, this Act mandates that the court
look only to the best interests of the child standard and determine
whether the father's consent to the adoption is required.33
sexual assault or domestic violence. As used in this subdivision, "abuse
against the child" means child abuse as defined in Section 11165.6 of the Penal
Code and "abuse against the other parent" means abuse as defined in subdivi-
sion (a) of Section 542 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(c) The nature and amount of contact with both parents.
Id.
27. 11 Cal. 3d 679, 523 P.2d 244, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974).
28. Id. at 698-99, 523 P.2d at 257-58, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 457-58.
29. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1991).
30. The California Supreme Court applied the detriment standard in In re Baby
Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d 65, 75, 688 P.2d 918, 925, 207 Cal. Rptr. 309, 316 (1984). In this case
the court found that California Civil Code § 4600 was applicable to all section 7017(d)
termination proceedings. Id. See CAL. Cxv. CODE § 4600; CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017(d)
(West Supp. 1991).
31. Michael U. v. Jamie B., 39 Cal. 3d 787, 705 P.2d 362, 218 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1985).
Four separate decisions were issued in this case. Three of the justices in the majority
found that in a putative father case, the detriment standard should not be applied and
the appropriate standard should be strictly the best interests of the child. Id
32. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 7000-7201 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
33. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017(d)(2) (West Supp. 1991) states:
If the natural father or a man representing himself to be the natural father
claims parental rights, the court shall determine if he is the father. The court
shall then determine if it is in the best interest of the child that the father re-
tain his parental rights, or that an adoption of the child be allowed to proceed.
The court, in making that determination, may consider all relevant evidence,
including the efforts made by the father to obtain custody, the age and prior
placement of the child and the effects of a change of placement on the child.
Some insight is needed to appreciate clearly the difficulty of apply-
ing the best interest of the child standard. Consider for example, the
progress of California law. The history of the applicability of section
4600 of the Civil Code, the detriment test or parental preference doc-
trine, has been quite tumultuous. Indeed, the California Supreme
Court and courts of appeal have wrestled with section 4600 for years
and unfortunately have arrived at divergent interpretations of what
the legislature intended. That such a debate arose at all is puzzling
in light of the introductory statement of section 4600, which reads in
pertinent part:
The Legislature finds and declares that it is the public policy of this state to
assure minor children of frequent and continuing contact with both parents
qfter the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage, and to encourage
parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child rearing in order to ef-
fect this policy.34
There followed a line of cases, beginning with In re B.G., that ef-
fectively applied Civil Code section 4600 and the parental preference
doctrine to any action involving child custody including guardianship,
termination, and putative father cases.35
IV. CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT
Subsequent to In re B.G., the Legislature amended section 232.5 to
require the court, to use the, best interests test in all proceedings to
free a child from parental custody or control. 36 The courts continued
If the court finds that it is in the best interest of the child that the father
should be allowed to retain his parental rights, it shall order that his consent
is necessary for an adoption. If the court finds that the man claiming parental
rights is not the father, or that if he is the father it is in the child's best inter-
est that an adoption be allowed to proceed, it shall order that persons's con-
sent is not required for an adoption: such a finding terminates all parental
rights and responsibilities with respect to the child. Section 4600 does not ap-
ply to this proceeding. Nothing in this section changes the rights of a pre-
sumed father.
Id. (emphasis added).
34. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(a) (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
35. 11 Cal. 3d 679, 523 P.2d 244, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974). See also In re Baby Boy
D., 159 Cal. App. 3d 8, 205 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1984).
In 1986, the Legislature resolved the issue and expressly stated that the proper test
was the best interest of the child, and that the detriment standard of Civil Code § 4600
did not apply. 1986 Cal. Stat. 1370.
The court in Micah S. stated:
But in 232 [termination] cases, every right afforded the parents, every reunifi-
cation service ordered, every continuance, and especially every appeal taken is
purchased at the expense of the person who is in law and morality the pri-
mary object of judicial solicitude, namely the child, That, in a nutshell, is the
frightful dilemma. And it is no longer open to question that the child's best
interest must be paramount.
In re Micah S., 198 Cal. App. 3d 557, 565, 243 Cal. Rptr. 756, 761 (1988) (Brauer, J.,
concurring).
36. "At all proceedings to declare a child free from parental custody and control,
the court shall consider the wishes of the child, bearing in mind the age of the child,
and shall act in the best interests of the child." 1983 Cal. Stat. 906 (codified as CAL.
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to require, however a finding of detriment as well as the best inter-
ests of the child before terminating parental rights.
Surprisingly, in 1984 the supreme court, in its opinion in In re Baby
Girl M,37 applied the detriment standard of Civil Code section 4600
to section 7017, putative father actions, seeking to dispense with the
necessity of a putative father's consent to adoption. 38
In reaction to In re Baby Girl M, and Michael U. v. Jamie B., the
Legislature resolved the dispute as to paternity actions by excluding
the detriment standard of section 4600 in these actions, and by plac-
ing the focus on the best interests of the child.39 In termination pro-
ceedings under section 232, however, the supreme court continued to
require a finding of "detriment" before parental rights could be ter-
minated.40 The disagreement regarding applicability continued de-
spite the obvious trend in the Legislature to thwart application of the
detriment standard. In a 1986 decision, the dichotomy was well ana-
lyzed in a thorough review by Justice Anderson of the First District
Court of Appeal.41 Justice Anderson traced the history of sections
232 and 4600 and concluded that the legislative changes to section 232
make it clear that the Legislature did not intend section 4600 to apply
to all termination proceedings.42 The Justice questioned the Califor-
nia Supreme Court's application of section 4600 to any parental ter-
CIV. CODE § 232.5 (West Supp. 1991)). This was the same language previously set out
in § 232(b).
37. 37 Cal. 3d 65, 688 P.2d 918, 207 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1984).
38. The court followed the rationale of In re .G. that section 4600 applied to all
custody proceedings. In re Baby M., 37 Cal. 3d at 69-71, 688 P.2d at 921-22, 207 Cal.
Rptr. at 312-13. Prior decisions such as W.E.J. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d 303,
160 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1979), and In re Marie R., 79 Cal. App. 3d 624, 145 Cal. Rptr. 122
(1978), and Cheryl H. v. Superior Court for County of Los Angeles, 41 Cal. App. 3d
273, 115 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1974), were thus, in effect, overruled.
39. Paternity actions fall under Civil Code Sections 7006 and 7017. CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 7006, 7017 (West Supp. 1991). Section 7017(d)(2) explicitly requires the best inter-
ests of the child standard. See supra note 33.
40. See In re Carmaleta B., 21 Cal. 3d 482, 579 P.2d 514, 146 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1978);
In re Richard E., 21 Cal. 3d 349, 579 P.2d 495, 146 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1978).
41. In re B.J.B., 185 Cal. App. 3d 1201, 230 Cal. Rptr. 332 (1986).
42. Justice Anderson explained:
Section 232 was added to the Civil Code in 1961 ... as part of an act which
completely revised the Welfare and Institutions Code chapter relating to juve-
nile court law.... Section 232 begins a chapter entitled "Freedom from Pa-
rental Custody and Control" (emphasis added) and defines the actions
available under the statute as "termination proceedings".... Section 4600 was
added eight years later in 1969... as part of "The Family Law Act"--an ex-
tensive body of legislation covering marriage, the dissolution thereof, custody
of children, support of children and the law of community property .... Sec-
tion 4600 set forth the order of preference for awards of custody.., then
made it clear that any award to non-parents under the statute had to be sup-
mination proceeding without analyzing legislative intent. 43
Finally, it should be noted that since 1965, proceedings under sec-
tion 232 have been governed by the mandate of section 232.5 which
states that it "shall be liberally construed to serve and protect the in-
ported by a finding that an award to a parent would be detrimental to the
child.
There is concrete evidence that the Legislature never intended section 232
termination proceedings to be governed by the mandate of section 4600, subdi-
vision (c). When section 4600 was added to the Civil Code in 1969, it contained
essentially the same language as exists today. Four years later in 1973, section
232 was substantially changed, including the addition of subdivision (a)(7)....
Unlike any of the other circumstances, the finding of which supports a termi-
nation of parental rights under subdivisions (a) (1) through (a)(6), subdivision
(a)(7) specifically required a determination "that return of the child to his
parent or parents would be detrimental to the child .... " Likewise, in 1984
the Legislature added subdivision (a)(8) providing for termination of the pa-
rental relationship for minors who have been declared dependent children of
the juvenile court as a result of physical abuse. That enactment specifically
requires a finding by the juvenile court "that attempts at reunification with
his or her parent or parents would be detrimental."
Moreover, the Legislature has twice amended the language requiring a finding
of detriment in subdivision (a)(7) since its enactment in 1973. It was originally
required that this element be shown beyond a reasonable doubt.... Later,
the statute was changed to require a showing of detriment only by clear and
convincing evidence .... Most recently, the clear and convincing evidence lan-
guage was removed .... Given this repeated legislative attention to the detri-
ment requirement of section 232, subdivision (a)(7) and (a)(8), it cannot be
concluded that the Legislature had already, years before, intended the detri-
ment language of section 4600 to govern all termination proceedings. For, if
section 4600 applied to all termination subdivisions of section 232 when it was
enacted in 1969, it likewise applied when section 232 was amended to add sub-
division (a)(7) in 1973; it also applied in 1976 and also in 1983 when these sub-
divisions were amended; and it applied in 1984 when subdivision (a)(8) was
added. And if applied in 1969, then the Legislature was engaging in idle acts
in 1973, 1976, 1983 and 1984.
In re B.J.B., 185 Cal. App. 3d at 1205-06, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 334-35 (citations omitted).
43. Justice Anderson went on to say:
Keeping in mind the presumption that the Legislature has in mind existing
laws when it passes a statute ... and that every word, phrase and provision
employed in the statute is intended to have meaning .... it is clear that the
Legislature would have had no reason to add this language to subdivisions
(a)(7) or (a)(8) if it had intended section 4600 to control all actions under sec-
tion 232.
The conclusion that the Legislature did not intend the detriment requirement
of section 4600 to have any application to termination proceedings is further
buttressed by an independent examination of section 232. Termination of pa-
rental rights may be adjudged on grounds of (1) child abandonment, (2) child
neglect, (3) parent moral depravity, (4) parent conviction of felony, (5) parent
mental illness, (6) parent mental disability, (7) child being in juvenile court
ordered out-of-home placement for more than one year, (8) child severely
abused. Detriment is specifically mentioned only in the latter two situations.
Applying the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation, inclusion unius est ex-
clusio alterius, the only rational conclusion is that legislative inclusion of a
detriment requirement for subdivision (a)(7) and (a)(8) without such specific
inclusion in subdivisions (a)(1) through (a)(6) is a legislative exclusion of such
requirement for the latter notwithstanding the enactment of section 4600 else-
where in the code.
In re B.J.B., 185 Cal. App. 3d at 1206-07, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 335 (citations omitted).
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terest and welfare of the child."44  Recently, section 232.5 was
amended to require that when deciding whether to terminate the pa-
rental relationship, the court should "consider the wishes of the
child."45 It follows that the Legislature could have included the det-
riment requirement in the section 232.5 amendment if it had wanted
to apply the detriment standard to all proceedings.
The continuing dispute and the misinterpretation of section 4600 in
the In re E.G. decision was finally settled by legislative action in
1988.4 The amended section states that section 4600 does not apply
to "proceedings pursuant to this section."47 To emphasize the point
further, the Legislature in 1987 added section 366.26 of the Welfare
and Institution Code.48 This section states in part, "[sjection 4600 of
the Civil Code is not applicable to these proceedings [to terminate pa-
rental rights]." 49 Further, the statute specifically requires the courts
to consider the best interests of the child: "At all termination pro-
ceedings, the court shall consider the wishes of the child and shall act
in the best interests of the child."50
In light of the history leading to the enactment of this section,
there can be no doubt that the legislative intent is, and always has
been, that the best interests of the child is the only standard to be
applied in any and all termination actions, and the detriment stan-
dard set out in section 4600 does not now, nor did it ever apply.5 1
To fully appreciate the impact of the changes to the Civil Code,
consider them in light of the comprehensive revisions of the Welfare
and Institutions Code. The Welfare and Institutions Code revisions
show a better comprehension of the needs of the child, and the best
44. 1965 Cal. Stat. 2710 (codified at CAL. CirV. CODE § 232.5 (West Supp. 1991)).
45. The code was amended subsequent to the supreme court's decisions in In re
Carmaleta B., 21 Cal. 3d 482, 579 P.2d 514, 146 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1978) and In re Richard
E., 21 Cal. 3d 349, 579 P.2d 495, 146 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1978). See 1983 Cal. Stat. 906 (codi-
fied at CAL. CIV. CODE § 232.5 (West Supp. 1991)).
The "wishes of the child" are explained as follows: "If a child is of sufficient age and
capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent preference as to custody, the court must
consider and give due weight to his wishes in making an award of custody or modifica-
tion thereof." CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
46. 1988 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1584 (West) (codified as Cal. Civ. Code § 232(d) (West
Supp. 1991)).
47. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(d) (West Supp. 1991).
48. 1987 Cal. Legis Serv, 709-12 (West) (amended by 1988 Cal. Legis. Serv. 2585-88
(West) (codified at CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26 (West Supp. 1991))).
49. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(a) (West Supp. 1991). This language does
not change in the amended version effective July 1, 1991. Id.
50. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(g) (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
51. See supra notes 42-43.
interests of the child.52
V. CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE SECTION 232
Prior to January 1, 1989, section 232 delineated the eight categories
under which parental rights could be terminated. These include:
(1) A child has been abandoned without support by both parents
for six months or by one parent for twelve months.53
(2) A child has been neglected or treated cruelly, and parents
were deprived of custody for one year.54
(3) Parents are disabled by alcohol or substance abuse, and parent
has not had custody for one year because of the alcohol or substance
52. 1982 revisions of the law have shortened the time within which children are to
be placed in a permanent home. The express intent was to extract children that were
in foster care under CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1991). Cf CAL. CIV.
CODE § 232 (West Supp. 1991).
53. Under CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(1) (West Supp. 1991), parental rights may be
terminated when the parent has not maintained contact or has not provided support
for a six (6) month period preceding the filing of a freedom petition. That six (6)
month period will not be deemed broken by token or sporadic contacts. CAL. Civ.
CODE § 232(a)(1) (West Supp. 1991). See In re Oukes, 14 Cal. App. 3d 459, 92 Cal. Rptr.
390 (1971); In re T.M.R., 41 Cal. App. 3d 694, 116 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1974). The period is
twelve (12) months when the child is with a parent. Signing a consent to adoption is
also probative evidence of intent to abandon. See In re Baby Boy M., 66 Cal. App. 3d
300, 125 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1975).
54. C. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1991). Civil Code section
232(a)(2) provides for termination of parental rights upon a showing that the Juvenile
Court had deprived the parent of custody of the minor for a period exceeding one (1)
year, on the grounds that the minor was "cruelly treated or neglected by his or her
parents." CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(2) (West Supp. 1991). See also In re Carmaleta B.,
21 Cal. 3d 482, 579 P.2d 514, 146 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1978). However, an additional element
deemed implicit therein is that the condition leading to Juvenile Court jurisdiction is a
"present circumstance" at the time of the freedom trial. Id. at 493, 579 P.2d at 521, 146
Cal. Rptr. at 630. See also In re Susan Lynn M., 53 Cal. App. 3d 300, 313, 125 Cal. Rptr.
707, 715 (1976).
In considering whether the conditions that initially gave rise to the cruelty and/or
neglect persist, i.e., they are a "present circumstance", the court may consider the fol-
lowing factors:
1. The parent's efforts to correct the personality/psychological problems that gave
rise to the cruelty and/or neglect;
2. The parent's efforts to train and/or find and maintain suitable employment so
that he/she might regain custody;
3. The parent's degree of rehabilitation and present capability to undertake the
care of the minor; and
4. The parent's willingness to acknowledge the source of the cruelty and/or ne-
glect, and take steps to assure the minor's future protection.
See In re Carmaleta B., 21 Cal. 3d at 494-95, 579 P.2d at 521-22, 146 Cal. Rptr at 630-31.
Inferentially, the courts may also consider whether the parent has maintained the
reunification plan provided by the Juvenile Court and the Department of Social Serv-
ices (hereinafter "DSS"); acknowledged the long-term, and possibly permanent, dam-
age to the minor resulting from the cruelty and/or neglect-including the parent's
willingness to deal with those problems; or attempted to overcome the estrangement
of the minor due to the length of separation. See In re Lynna B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 682,
700, 155 Cal. Rptr. 256, 265-66 (1979).
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abuse.55
(4) Parent is convicted of a felony of a nature to prove
unfitness.56
(5) Parent is declared mentally ill or developmentally disabled
and is unable to care for the child.57
(6) Parent is unable to control or support child because of par-
ent's mental deficiency or illness.s8
(7) The child is under the court's or welfare department's super-
vision, or in a foster home, for one year and return to the home is
detrimental to the child.59
(8) A minor is determined to be a dependent child of the judicial
court and reunification is not available.60
55. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(3) (West Supp. 1991). Cf CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 300 (West Supp. 1991).
56. Under Civil Code section 232(a)(4), a showing that the parent was convicted of
child abuse will sustain a finding of unfitness. CAL CIV. CODE § 232(a)(4) (West Supp.
1991). See In re Angelia P., 28 Cal. 3d 908, 623 P.2d 198, 171 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1981); In re
Sarah H., 106 Cal. App. 3d 326, 165 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1980) (conviction of manslaughter
arising out of the father beating the mother to death). The facts must be of a nature
that show the parent is unfit to have custody and control of the child. See also In re
D.S.C., 93 Cal. App. 3d 14, 155 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1979) (burglary); In re Geoffrey G., 98
Cal. App. 3d 412, 159 Cal. Rptr. 460 (1979) (murder while intoxicated).
57. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(5) (West Supp. 1991). A sustained defense of a crimi-
nal action on the grounds of insanity is a sufficient judicial declaration. See In re Mark
K., 159 Cal. App. 3d 99, 205 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1984).
58. Such a finding was sustained on the testimony of two qualified experts who
found the parent to suffer from chronic schizophrenia which disabled the parent to the
point of being unable to care for the child. In re Heidi T., 87 Cal. App. 3d 864, 871-73,
151 Cal. Rptr. 263, 266-67 (1978) (citing CAL CIV. CODE § 232(a)(6) (West Supp. 1991)).
The requirements for this subsection are met when the father's violent tendency is
shown, and the requirements of Civil Code section 232(a)(5) have been met. See In re
Mark K., 159 Cal. App. 3d 99, 104-08, 205 Cal. Rptr. 393, 398-401 (1984) (citing CAL.
Cov. CODE § 232(a)(5) (West Supp. 1991)).
Harm cannot be presumed from the mere fact of mental illness. The court must bal-
ance the alternatives and consider the nature of the illness and how it effects the abil-
ity to parent. See In re Jamie M., 134 Cal. App. 3d 530, 184 Cal. Rptr. 778 (1982).
59. In essence, Civil Code section 232(a)(7) requires a showing that: (a) the minor
has been in out-of-home placement for at least one year and (b) "the parents have
failed and are likely to fail in the future to provide a home and family relationship."
CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(7) (West Supp. 1991). See In re Norma M., 77 Cal. App. 3d
110, 116, 143 Cal. Rptr. 412, 415 (1978); In re Lynna B., 92 Cal. App. 3d at 700, 155 Cal.
Rptr. at 265-66. In considering this issue, the court properly may distinguish between a
"home" ("a place where one lives with... her family... feels secure with its familiar
conditions, circumstances, and associations"), and a suitable furnished "house." I& at
699-700, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 265-66. Further, the court may consider the efforts made by
the parent to overcome the lack of relationship with the minor and the parent's likeli-
hood of overcoming these difficulties. Id
60. This subsection requires a showing that a child three years or under has been
severely abused and reunification should not be provided pursuant to CAL. WELF. &
When a child has been placed in out-of-home placement, the court
considers detriment to the child if returned to the parent. The court
looks to the parent's past behavior as an indication of future behav-
ior.6 1 Courts that focused on the parent-child relationship raised
high hopes that custody would be awarded in the best interests of the
child.
Unfortunately, the language of the statute requires that petitioners
prove that return of the minor to the parent would be detrimental to
the minor's interests and also determine the best interests of the
child.62 However, this may be shown by proof that termination of
parental rights is the "least detrimental alternative."6 3 This test can
be met by showing that return of the minor will mean disrupting a
healthy existing bond with psychological parents in the mere hope
that the biological parents will one day be able to provide a suitable
"home".6 4
Petitioners must still prove, however, that the parents were af-
forded assistance and a reasonable opportunity to rehabilitate them-
selves as parents and were unable to do so.65 This requirement is
shown by proof that appropriate guidance, education and assistance
were provided by DSS, that it was offered and refused by the parents,
or that there was some other reason rendering it impossible to do
SO. 6 6
For instance, in considering whether "present circumstances" show
a continuation of the condition that led to the Juvenile Court finding
of "cruel treatment and neglect," the court may:
1. Deem the findings of the Juvenile Court as conclusively bind-
ing, i.e., a collateral estoppel-in reference to the literal require-
ments of section 232(a)(2);6 7 and
INST. CODE § 361.5(b)(3)-(5) (West Supp. 1991). See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(8)
(West Supp. 1991).
61. "[A] measure of a parent's future potential is undoubtedly revealed in the par-
ent's past behavior with the child." In re Angelia P., 28 Cal. 3d at 925, 623 P.2d at 208,
171 Cal. Rptr. at 647. See also In re Lynna B., 92 Cal. App. 3d at 700, 155 Cal. Rptr. at
265-66; In re Norma M., 77 Cal. App. 3d at 116, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
62. See, e.g., In re Carmaleta B., 21 Cal. 3d at 495-96, 579 P.2d at 518, 146 Cal. Rptr.
at 627; In re Susan Lynn M., 53 Cal. App. 3d at 315, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
63. See In re Carmaleta B., 21 Cal. 3d at 496, 579 P.2d at 518, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
64. See In re Lynna B., 92 Cal. App. 3d at 696-99, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 262-65; In re
Laura F., 33 Cal. 3d 826, 838, 662 P.2d 922, 930, 191 Cal. Rptr. 464, 472 (1983).
65. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 232 (West Supp. 1991); In re Susan Lynn M., 53 Cal. App.
3d at 310-12, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 713-15; In re Lynna B., 92 Cal. App. 3d at 701-02, 155 Cal.
Rptr. at 266-67.
66. In re Susan Lynn M., 53 Cal. App. 3d at 310-12, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 715-17; In re
Lynna B., 92 Cal. App. 3d at 701-02, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 913-15. In order to meet their
burden of proof, petitioners must prove the elements of their case by "clear and con-
vincing" evidence. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(c) (West Supp. 1991); In re Lynna B., 92 Cal.
App. 3d at 701, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 266; In re David E., 85 Cal. App. 3d 632, 634-35, 150
Cal. Rptr. 790, 790-91 (1978).
67. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(2) (West Supp. 1991).
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2. Consider the past acts as evidence tending to show "present cir-
cumstances." 6 Similarly, past acts may be considered as evidence
tending to show that the parent is unlikely to cure past and present
problems.69
VI. CALIFORNIA WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS CODE
California Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 provides
that parental rights70 shall be terminated if the court determines by
clear and convincing evidence that it is likely the minor will be
adopted.71 This code contemplates factors that sustain or deny a par-
ent-child relationship. The factors closely align with those enumer-
ated in section 232.72 The considerations include:
1. The whereabouts of the parents is unknown.7 3
2. The parent is suffering from a mental disability rendering the
parent unable to adequately care for and control the child.74
3. The minor child, after being removed due to physical/sexual
abuse and subsequently returned to the parents, is removed a second
time due to physical/sexual abuse.7 5
4. The parent of the minor has been convicted of causing the
death of another child through abuse or neglect.7 6
68. See In re Carmaleta B., 21 Cal. 3d at 493, 579 P.2d at 521, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 630.
69. See In re Lynna B., 92 Cal. App. 3d at 700, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 265-66; In re Laura
F., 33 Cal. 3d at 835, 662 P.2d at 928, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 470; In re T.M.R., 41 Cal. App. 3d
694, 698, 116 Cal. Rptr. 292, 294 (1974) ("[C]ommunications which took place only when
legal action was threatened may properly be found to be token only."); In re Oukes, 14
Cal. App. 3d 459, 92 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1971). However, section 232 was amended in 1988,
effective August 29, 1988, applicable to children that become dependents of the Juve-
nile Court after January 1, 1989, to include section 232(e) which provides:
This section does not apply to minors adjudged dependent children of the ju-
venile court pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 360 of the Welfare and In-
stitutions Code and Section 224, 224(m), and 7017 of this code provide the
exclusive means for the termination of parental rights.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(e) (West Supp. 1991).
70. Parental rights are defined as rights of a biological mother or presumed father.
In general, a father becomes presumed when he takes steps that would have legiti-
mated the child. See In re Michael D., 209 Cal. App. 3d 122, 256 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1989).
These acts include a marriage with the mother or the father receiving the child into
his home and holding the child out as his own. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(a) (West
1983 & Supp. 1990).
71. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(c) (West Supp. 1991).
72. See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
73. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5(b)(1) (West Supp. 1991).
74. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5(2) (West Supp. 1991). Cf. CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 232(a)(6) (West Supp. 1991).
75. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5(3) (West Supp. 1991).
76. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5(4) (West Supp. 1991).
5. The minor has suffered severe physical abuse by a parent or
persons known by the parent (where parent knows or reasonably
should know of abuse).77
6. The whereabouts of the parents have been unknown for six
months, and the grounds for the minor's removal were that the mi-
nor had been left without provision for support or the parent has
been incarcerated or institutionalized and cannot arrange for the mi-
nor's care.
78
7. The parent has been convicted of a felony indicating parental
unfitness.79
8. The parent has failed to visit or contact the child for a period of
six months.80
9. Return of the child after eighteen months of out-of-home
placement would create a substantial risk of detriment to the physi-
cal or emotional well-being of the child.8s
Notwithstanding satisfaction of any grounds for parental termina-
tion, the court may refrain from terminating parental rights to cus-
tody if it is found termination would be detrimental to the minor.
Such detriment may be due to: established contact with the parents;
the child's objection, where the child is at least ten years old; the
child is unlikely to be adopted; or, removal from the present
nonparental home would be detrimental.8 2 If the court finds the mi-
nor is not adoptable or termination of parental rights is contrary to
the minor's interests, the court orders placement in a preferential
order.8 3
77. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5(5) (West Supp. 1991).
78. CAL. WELl. & INST. CODE §§ 366.21(e), .26 (West Supp. 1991).
79. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.21(e) (West Supp. 1991).
80. Id
81. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.22(a) (West Supp. 1991).
82. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(c)(1) (West Supp. 1991).
(A) The parents or guardians have maintained regular visitation and contact with the
minor and the minor would benefit from continuing the relationship.
(B) A minor 10 years of age or older objects to termination of parental rights.
(C) The child is placed in a residential treatment facility, adoption is unlikely or un-
desirable, and continuation of parental rights will not prevent finding permanent fam-
ily placement if the parents cannot resume custody when residential care is no longer
needed.
(D) The minor is living with a relative or foster parent who is unable or unwilling to
adopt the minor because of exceptionable circumstances, which do not include an un-
willingness to accept legal responsibility for the minor, but who is willing and capable
of providing the minor with a stable and permanent environment and the removal of
the minor from the physical custody of his or her relative or foster parent would be
detrimental to the emotional well-being of the minor.
Id
83. The court will order placement in the following order:
1. Appointment of the minor's present caretakers or appropriate persons as guardi-
ans of the minor. However, if the minor is living with a relative or foster parents who
are unwilling to become guardians, but willing and able to continue providing care and
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Amended section 366.26 of the Welfare and Institutions Code rep-
resents the California Legislature's intent to focus primarily on the
child's best interests. Those provisions that establish grounds for ter-
mination of parental rights allow for prompt termination of parental
rights, thus avoiding the problems often encountered with judicial re-
view and permanency planning hearings. Once a child has been
made a dependent, a court may proceed immediately to terminate pa-
rental rights if certain factors are present.8 4 These include situations
where the whereabouts of the parent is unknown, or the parent is
mentally disabled, or the child was sexually or physically abused, or
the parent caused the death of another child, or the child was abused
by a person known by the parent, or the parent was convicted of a
felony indicative of unfitness.8 5 Arguably, a termination proceeding
could occur as soon as six months at the first judicial review. This
interpretation, however, has met certain opposition which contends
that reunification must provide for at least a twelve month period.86
Yet, the latter opposition is not reasonable considering the remain-
ing grounds for termination of parental rights. These include situa-
tions where the whereabouts of the parent is unknown for six
months and the child was removed because he or she was left with-
out support or the parent was incarcerated or institutionalized; or the
parent has not contacted the child in six months, or the child has
been out of the home for eighteen months and returning the child
would be detrimental.8 7 Essentially, these situations allow the court
to terminate parental rights where reunification has been offered for
a twelve month period and the guardian or biological parent has
failed to adequately comply with reunification,88 thus failing to main-
tain a parent-child relationship.
It must be noted that whenever a court hears grounds outlined in
removal, due to substantial psychological ties, would be seriously detrimental for the
minor, the court shall order the minor remain with such relative or foster parents; or
2. Order the minor remain in long-term foster care; or
3. If the court finds there exists no suitable foster parents, the court may order the
care, custody, and control of the minor transferred to a licensed foster agency for suit-
able placement. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(c)(3), (4) (West Supp. 1991).
84. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 300-304 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
85. The elements the court considers are numbers one through five and number
seven discussed supra at notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
86. The opposition usually argues that parental rights are supreme and that to
preserve them the parent must be given every opportunity to protect those rights.
87. See supra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
88. Failure to comply with reunification occurs when "the conditions that caused
the original dependency have not been, and are not likely to be corrected." In re Al-
bert B., 215 Cal. App. 3d 361, 378, 263 Cal. Rptr. 694, 702 (1989).
section 366.26, all the court must first assess is whether the child is
adoptable.8 9 If so, the court shall order the child referred to the ap-
propriate adoption agency for adoptive placement. The adoption stat-
utes of all jurisdictions are aimed at promoting the best interests of
the child.
California Civil Code section 233 provides that "interested" persons
may petition under section 232 to free a child from parental control
and custody.90 However, unless the child is also a dependent child
under the juvenile court, this applies only (1) if the child is "aban-
doned to [the] care and custody of another"; or (2) the parent is "con-
victed of a felony"; or (3) the parents "are declared to be
developmentally disabled or mentally ill"; or (4) the "parent or par-
ents are mentally disabled."91 The courts have applied section
232(a)(7) where the child has been under the probate court's supervi-
sion via guardianship and the parent has failed to maintain the par-
ent-child relationship.92
Pursuant to section 366.25(g) of the Welfare & Institution Code,
foster parents are entitled to preference and may proceed under Civil
Code section 233 when a child is available for adoption, was declared
a dependent prior to January 1, 1989, and the agency seeks to make
other placement, or fails to pursue termination.93  In the case of
adopting petitioners, the provisions of section 224 also apply, and a
choice must be made between section 232(a)(1) and section 224.94
Section 224 imposes the burden of proving both failure to communi-
cate and failure to support in order to meet the abandonment
criteria.95
In all other respects, the applicable subsections of section 232 ap-
ply, including the clear and convincing standard of proof, appoint-
89. Section 366.26 applies to hearings terminating parental rights or establishing
guardianship of minors adjudged dependent children of the court. CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 366.26.
90. In pertinent part, Civil Code section § 233 provides that, "[a]ny interested per-
son may petition . . . for an order or judgment declaring the minor person free from
the custody and control of either or both his or her parents." CAL. CIV. CODE § 233
(West 1982).
91. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232 (a)(1), (4)-(7) (West Supp. 1991).
92. In re Mark Anthony B., No. Civ. G003927 (Cal. Ct. App. May 29, 1987). See
also CAL. PROB. CODE § 2102 (West 1981).
93. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.25(g) (West Supp. 1991).
94. Section 232(a)(1) states: "An action may be brought for the purpose of having
any child under the age of 18 years declared free from the custody and control of
either or both of his or her parents when the child comes within any of the following
descriptions:" See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text. CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 232(a)(1) (West Supp. 1991).
Section 224 states that the consent of a parent is not required when (1) the parent
has been judicially deprived of custody, or (2) the parent has deserted the child, or (3)
where the parent has relinquished the child for adoption. CAL. CIV. CODE § 224 (West
1982).
95. In re Murray, 86 Cal. App. 3d 222, 150 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1978).
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ment of counsel for the minor,96 as well as a "guardian ad litem,"97
and appointed counsel for the parent.98 However, the detriment
standard of section 4600 does not apply, and the best interests of the
child is the controlling criteria.99
The legislature reacted to the judicial propensity for over-emphasis
on parental rights, and in 1983 adopted the following language:
The provision of this chapter shall be liberally construed to serve and protect
the interests and welfare of the child. At all proceedings to declare a child
free from parental custody and control, the court shall consider the wishes of
the child, bearing in mind the age of the child, and shall act in the best inter-
ests of the child.1 0 0
The legislature made it even clearer that the standard should be the
best interests of the child with the following language: "The purpose
of this chapter is to serve the welfare and best interests of a child by
providing the stability and security of an adoptive home when those
conditions are otherwise missing from his other life."101
When determining what is in the best interests of the child, the
court looks to the impact and/or harmful effects that are likely to oc-
cur if the child is uprooted. The court must consider the bonds that a
child forms in early years and the emotional impact if those bonds
are severed. 9 2 Further, the court analyzes the impact of interrupt-
ing the child's continuity of environment.103 Child psychiatrists sug-
96. CAL. CIV. CODE § 237.5(a) (West Supp. 1991).
97. CAL. CIV. CODE § 237 (West Supp. 1991).
98. CAL. CIV. CODE § 237.5(b) (West Supp. 1991).
99. In re Christopher S., 197 Cal. App. 3d 433, 438, 242 Cal. Rptr. 866, 868 (1987).
100. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232.5 (West Supp. 1991).
101. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232.6 (West Supp. 1991). In one case, the court stated:
It may be suggested that nothing be done, that the children be permitted to
stay where they are. As noted several times, however, the purpose of the stat-
ute permitting termination of parental rights is to 'serve the welfare and best
interests of a child by providing the stability and security of an adoptive home
.... To facilitate the stated goals, "it seems indisputable that... the state as
a parens patriae not only has a compelling interest but also a duty to sever the
parental bonds once a situation contemplated by the statute arises."
See In re Laura F., 33 Cal. 3d 826, 837, 662 P.2d 922, 929, 191 Cal. Rptr 464, 471 (1983)
(citations omitted).
102. In In re Rose Lynn G., 57 Cal. App. 3d 406, 129 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1976), the court
said:
[A]n important element that a trial court must consider, when making a deci-
sion about children, is the impact of the passage of time. Childhood is short;
many basic attitudes and capacities are developed in very early years. Ties are
formed to the adults present in the child's life, and can only be broken by in-
viting emotional disaster.
Id, at 425, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
103. In In re Michelle T., 44 Cal. App. 3d 699, 117 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1975), the court
rejected removal of the child from the petitioners saying:
According to the authorities, changes or interruptions in this relationship
gest that "stability of the environment" is more important than the
type of environment.10 4
The courts tend to perceive children as easily adaptable to
change.105 But some experts warn that because of a child's limited
perception of the future, the child is less able to adapt to a sudden
change in environment than an adult.106 To a young child, a current
catastrophe may appear permanent. Serious harmful effects are
likely to follow the uprooting of a child.
VII. THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT.
In January 1976, the Uniform Parentage Act became effective and
removed from the code the archaic terms "legitimate" and "illegiti-
mate," and therewith the connotation of bastardy.107 The UPA rec-
cause the child to regress "along the whole line of his affections, skills,
achievements and social adaptation".... "Recently, authorities have recog-
nized the importance of the continuity of the environment and the trauma to
a young child caused by separation from its established home has been viewed
by the courts as a serious consideration in adoption cases.
Id. at 706, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 859-60 (quoting J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNrr, BE-
YOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 18 (1973)). See also Williams v. Neumann, 405
S.W.2d 556, 557 (Ky. App. 1966), where the court stated: "[The child] cannot suddenly
be transplanted like a dogwood tree without running serious and dangerous risk of
frustration and bewilderment."
104. One writer suggests:
Today most experts in these fields agree that once a child is placed in a foster
or adoptive home for a period of time enabling the child to adjust to that
home, it may be dangerous to the child's emotional health to uproot him. "In
the view of most child psychiatrists, stability of the environment is far more
crucial than its precise nature and content." Scientific findings have led psy-
chiatrists to testify in foster care and adoption proceedings, that to uproot a
child threatens the development of the child's ability to form relationships
based upon love, for the child seeks to insulate against an anticipated sudden
loss.
Inker, Expanding the Rights of Children in Custody and Adoption Cases, 5 FAM. L. Q.
417, 420-21 (1971) (quoting Watson, The Children of Armageddon: Problems of Custody
Following Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 55, 71 (1969)).
105. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
106. Psychiatrists and psychologists have warned for, some time that a young
child, far from being more adaptable to change, is emotionally more delicate
than an adult and more apt to be damaged, sometime permanently, when up-
rooted from a secure environment. Young children are more emotionally deli-
cate than adults in part because they have no "sense of time" which prevents
them from seeing beyond a current catastrophe.
Bodenheimer, New Trends and Requirements in Adoption Law and Proposal for Leg-
islative Change, 49 S. CAL. L. REV 10, 20 (1975).
107. The Uniform Parentage Act [hereinafter UPA] was enacted by the California
Legislature in modified form as CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 7000-7021 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990).
The UPA has been enacted in sixteen other states. See ALA. CODE §§ 26-17-1 to -21
(1975); COLAO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-4-101 to -129 (Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 §§ 801
to 819 (Supp. 1990); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 584-1 to -26 (Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
40, 2501-2526 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1110 to -1129 (1986);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 257.51 - .74 (West 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 210.817 - .852 (Vernon
Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-6-101 to -135 (1989); NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 126.011 -
.391 (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:17-38 to -59 (West Supp. 1989); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-
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ognizes that a parent-child relationship exists regardless of marital
status.08 The California courts, however, still required a finding of
detriment to the child in applying the Act.109 The code created, in-
stead, two classes of fathers: "alleged fathers" and "presumed fa-
thers."110 Civil Code section 7004 delineates the criteria by which the
court determines into which category a father fits. The criteria are
similar to the former legitimation statutes."'
The terms "alleged" and "presumed" are not used in the eviden-
tiary sense, rather they are identifying terms of the two classes of fa-
thers. The rights attached to the two classes are significantly
different. Indeed, a biological father is not necessarily a "presumed"
father." 2
The presumed father has the right to custody, services, and earn-
ings of the unmarried minor child,"n3 and the right to veto an adop-
tion.114 The alleged father has the right to a hearing to determine his
status as presumed versus alleged.115 The reported cases decided
since the effective date of the Uniform Parentage Act bring into fo-
cus the policy behind the Act.
A mother can prevent the alleged father from becoming a pre-
17-01 to -26 (1981 & Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.01 - .38 (Anderson
1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-8 to -27 (1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.010 - .905
(Supp. 1989); WYO. STAT. §§ 14-2-101 to -120 (1977).
108. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 7002 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990); UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT
§ 2, 9B U.L.A. 287, 296 (1987).
109. See In re Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d 65, 688 P.2d 918, 207 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1984);
Michael U. v. Jamie B., 39 Cal. 3d 787, 705 P.2d 362, 218 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1985). See supra
notes 30-31.
110. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1990). A father becomes pre-
sumed when he does certain acts that "legitimate" the child. These acts include mar-
rying the child's mother and receiving the child into his home as his own child. Id.
111. CAL. CIV. CODE § 230. Custodial rights are now delineated in CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 197 (West 1982) which is similar to the former CAL.'CIV. CODE § 200. The new sec-
tion replaced the old at the effective date of the Uniform Parentage Act, January 1976.
112. As one court noted:
It is apparent that the term "presumed father" as used in California Civil
Code § 7017 does not denote a'presumption in the evidentiary sense at all.
Rather it uses the term as a convenient means of identifying a class reference
to § 7004.... The effect of this classification is that a man may be able to
show that he is indisputably the biological father of the child, but he may not
hold a power to veto an adoption because he does not come within the class
defined by reference to § 7004.
W.E.J. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d 303, 160 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1979) (emphasis
added).
113. CAL. CIV. CODE § 197 (West 1982).
114. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017(d) (West Supp. 1991).
115. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7006 (West Supp. 1991). A § 7006 hearing must be consoli-
dated with a § 7017 hearing. 1986 Cal. Stat. 4901.
sumed father by obstructing the minimum required contact. It is not
sufficient that the father attempt such contacts. In In re Marie R,116
for example, the court recognized that a mother may prevent a natu-
ral father from establishing the minimum contact required to become
a presumed father.117 A year later in W.E.J. v. Superior Court,"18
the court explicitly stated that "with respect to a non-marital child,
the mother may, by her conduct, prevent the male from acquiring
the status of 'presumed father' which would have given him a veto
over adoption." 119
There are two situations where a father cannot legitimate a non-
marital child where he wants to recognize the child. First, the father
cannot legitimate the child in situations where his wife, not the
mother of the child, refuses to allow the child into the home. Sec-
ond, the father cannot legitimate the child where the natural mother
will not relinquish custody and prevents the father from receiving
the child.120
In broad terms, California Civil Code section 7006 provides that a
mother, presumed father, or other interested party can bring an ac-
tion to establish the non-existence of a parental relationship.121 Sec-
116. 79 Cal. App. 3d 624, 145 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1978); see also In re Rebecca B., 68 Cal.
App. 3d 193, 137 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1977).
117. In re Marie R., 79 Cal. App. 3d. at 630, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 126 ("Absent even the
minimal contact... there can be no receipt, constructive or otherwise, into the house
of a purported father.") (citations omitted).
118. 100 Cal. App. 3d 303, 160 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1979).
119. Id at 310, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 867. But see In re Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d 365, 688
P.2d 918, 207 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1984) (the father must have "a reasonable opportunity to
assert and effectuate the right of parental preference"). For twenty years prior to the
decisions in Marie R., 79 Cal. App. 3d 624, 145 Cal. Rptr. 122, and W.E.J., 100 Cal. App.
3d 303, 160 Cal. Rptr. 862, the courts had refused to hold that the putative father could
legitimate the child against the will of the mother. See Cheryl H. v. Superior Court, 41
Cal. App. 3d 273, 115 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1974); In re Pierce, 15 Cal. App. 3d 244, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 171 (1971); Truschke v. LaRocca, 237 Cal. App. 2d 75, 46 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1965); In
re Irby, 226 Cal. App. 2d 238, 37 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1964); In re Smith, 42 Cal. 2d 91, 265
P.2d 888 (1954).
120. The Court noted in In re Irby:
This case recognizes that there are two situations in which the father of an
illegitimate child cannot legitimate the child even though he is willing to do
so. The first situation is where his wife who is not the mother of the child,
refuses to permit him to receive the child into the family circle and the second
is where the natural mother of the child refuses to give up custody of the
child thereby preventing him from receiving the child. If either of these con-
sents is lacking, he may not legitimate the child.
226 Cal. App. 2d at 238, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
121. Section 7006 generally states that:
(a) The child, its mother or a presumed father under 7004(a)(1), (2), (3) may bring
an action (1) any time to establish presumed father status, or (2) if within a reasonable
time to declare the non-existence of the paternal relationship presumed is rebutted
then any other man who a party may have paternity established.
(b) Any interested party, at any time, may bring an action to determine the exist-
ence or non-existence of the paternal relationship presumed under 7004(a).
(c) When there is no presumed father under 7004, an action may be brought to de-
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tion 7017 contemplates that where notice of the alleged paternity is
served on the father he must, within thirty days, bring an action
under section 7006 to assert his rights. The thirty-day period can also
be started by the birth of the child, whichever period ends later.122
The filing of the section 7006 petition case holds in abeyance the
proceedings in the adoption case until ruling on the pending petition
under sections 7017(d)(2) and 7006, which must be consolidated.123
The October, 1984 California Supreme Court decision in Baby Girl
M124 cast doubt on earlier cases that dealt with the prior language of
section 7006 and section 7017. The Court applied the parental prefer-
ence of section 4600 to all section 7017(d) proceedings. The court
ruled that the mother's consent to adoption triggers the elevation of
the putative father's rights, and the detriment standard of section
4600 applies before his rights may be terminated.125 The "alleged"
father's rights in such cases are then the same as those of a presumed
father. The alleged father's rights, including custody, may be termi-
nated only on a showing that granting such rights would be detri-
mental to the child.126 Baby Girl M, seemed to take a 180 degree
turn from case and statutory law going back over twenty years,
which focused on the best interest of the child, and which abrogated
the "alleged" father's rights to that goal.'2
Following this, an appellate court in Michael U. v. Jamie B.
awarded the "alleged" father custody pendente lite, but did so with-
out stating which standard the court applied, nor providing any other
findings upon which the decision was based.128 The law in the area
termine the existence of the paternal relationship. Such an action shall be consoli-
dated with the § 7017 action.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 7006 (West Supp. 1991).
122. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017(d)(1) (West Supp. 1991).
123. Adoption cannot proceed without consent except under specific circumstances.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 224 (West 1982).
124. 37 Cal. 3d 65, 688 P.2d 918, 207 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1984).
125. See, e.g., In re Baby Boy D., 159 Cal. App. 3d 8, 205 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1984); In re
Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d 65, 688 P.2d 918, 207 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1984).
126. "Alleged" father and "presumed" father are not terms of evidentiary meaning,
but rather are labels to define the legal status of a father. See W.E.J. v. Superior
Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d 303, 160 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1979). See also notes 69 and 107-09 and
accompanying text.
127. See In re Richard M., 14 Cal. 3d 783, 537 P.2d 363, 122 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1975); In
re Barnett, 54 Cal. 2d 370, 354 P.2d 18, 6 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1969); W.E.J. v. Superior Court,
100 Cal. App. 3d 303, 160 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1979); In re Marie R., 79 Cal. App. 3d 624, 145
Cal. Rptr. 122 (1978).
128. 160 Cal. App. 3d 193, 206 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1984), vacated, 39 Cal. 3d 787, 705 P.2d
362, 218 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1985).
of parental rights was then thrown into an extreme state of flux
when the California Supreme Court reversed the appellate court.129
The court was highly divided, as reflected in four separate opinions.
Three of the majority justices urged that Baby Girl M. be reversed.
In response to Baby Girl M, and Michael U. v. Jamie B., the legisla-
ture acted in the 1986 session and identified the correct* standard to
be the best interest of the child.130
The decisions in Baby Girl M. and Michael U. v. Jamie B. provide
an historical background and give meaning to the 1986 amendment to
sections 7006 and 7017. Those amendments provide that the best in-
terest of the child is the standard for determining whether an alleged
father should obtain custody of a non-marital child.13l
The clarity of the statute was again cast into confusion, however,
with the case of Jermstad v. McNelis.132 In May, 1989, the Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal concluded in a circuitous decision that to the
extent that Baby Girl M. was based on constitutional grounds, legisla-
tive enactment could not overturn the decision.133 The court held
that a putative father could not be denied a parental preference and
that the statute as amended would not preclude such'a preference. 134
The court went so far as to state that the best interests of the child
was not a consideration, implying that the putative father had to be
shown to be "unfit".135
129. 39 Cal. 3d 787, 705 P.2d 362, 218 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1985).
130. 1986 Cal. Stat. 4904 (codified as CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017(d)(2) (West Supp.
1991)). See In re Christopher Brian S., 197 Cal. App. 3d 433, 242 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1987).
131. In pertinent part, the amendments provided:
Such an action shall be consolidated with a proceeding pursuant to subdivision
(b) of Section 7017. The pairental rights of the alleged natural father shall be
determined as set forth in subdivision (d) of Section 7017.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 7006(c) (West Supp. 1991).
If the natural father or a man representing himself to be the natural father
claims parental rights, the court shall determine if it is in the best interest 'of
the child that the father retain his parental rights, or that an adoption of the
child be allowed to proceed. The court, in making the determination, may
consider all relevant evidence, including the efforts made by the father to ob-
tain custody, the age and prior placement of the child, and the effects of a
change of placement of the child. If the court finds that it is in the best inter-
est of the child that the father should be allowed to retain his parental rights,
it shall order that his consent is necessary for an adoption. If the court finds
that the man claiming parental rights is not the father, or that if he is the fa-
ther it is in the child's best interest that an adoption be allowed to proceed, it
shall order that person's consent is not required for an adoption; such a find-
ing terminates all parental rights and responsibilities with respect to the child.
Section 4600 does not apply to this proceeding. Nothing in this section
changes the rights of a presumed father.
CAL CIV. CODE § 7017(d)(2) (West Supp. 1991).
132. 210 Cal. App. 3d 528, 258 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1989).
133. Id at 549, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 531.
134. Id. at 551, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 533. The court relied on Lehr v. Robertson, 463
U.S. 248 (1983).
135. Jermstad, 210 Cal. App. at 553, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 534. But see Michael U. v. Ja-
mie B., 39 Cal. 3d 787, 796, 705 P.2d 362, 368, 218 Cal. Rptr. 39, 45 (1985).
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On February 22, 1990, the Sixth District Court of Appeal issued its
decision in In re Kelsey S.136 The putative father there argued that
he was a presumed father by virtue of constructive receipt of the
child into his home, that he was entitled to parental placement pref-
erence, and that his rights could not be terminated absent application
of the clear and convincing standard of proof.
The court rejected those contentions and ruled that the construc-
tive receipt doctrine is not constitutionally mandated. 137 The court
stated that the United States Supreme Court case of Lehr v. Robert-
son does not mandate that the rights of putative fathers are equal to
those of the mother. 138 Further, the court disagreed with the broad
statements of Jermstad that a parental preference must be afforded
the father.139 Finally, the court ruled that termination of the non-
presumed father's rights required a preponderance of the evidence
rather than the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence.140
VIII. CUSTODY BATTLES AND THE IMPACT ON THE CHILD.
In general, a section 7017(d) petition usually arises in adoption
cases after initial investigation by the Department of Social Services
and an interview with the mother.141 If the potential father has been
identified, he must be given notice of potential paternity, and as a
further caution, he must be put on notice' 42 that he must initiate an
action within thirty days to assert any right he might have.143 If he
fails to file such an action within thirty days of service, his rights may
be terminated.144
In the processing of these contested cases, regardless of the code
section under which they are filed, the court must act with a great
deal of caution in order to avoid multiple changes of custody. The
impact on the child can be disastrous. These principles require that
136. 218 Cal. App. 3d 130, 266 Cal. Rptr. 760, retew granted, 790 P.2d 238, 269 Cal.
Rptr. 74 (1990).
137. Kelsey S., 218 Cal. App. 3d at 133-36, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 762-64; see also In re
Sabrina H., 217 Cal. App. 3d 702, 266 Cal. Rptr. 274 (1990).1
138. "Nothing in Lehr mandates that the rights of fathers ... with 'potential' rather
than 'substantial' relationships with their children be equal to those of the child's
mother." Kelsey S., 218 Cal. App. 3d at 136, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 764.
139. Kelsey S., 218 Cal. App. 3d at 138, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 765. See Jermstad v. McNe-
lis, 210 Cal. App. 3d 528, 258 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1989).
140. Kelsey S., 218 Cal. App. 3d at 139-40, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 766.
141. CAL. CIV, CODE § 7017(c) (West Supp. 1991).
142. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017(f) (West Supp. 1991).
143. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017(d)(1) (West Supp. 1991).
144. See In re Manuel J., 150 Cal. App. 3d 513, 197 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1984).
interim changes in custody be avoided, unless the child is in immi-
nent danger or will suffer adverse consequences as a result of the
current environment. 4 5  These principles should apply to stays
pending appeal as well as pendente lite changes in custody.146
Unlike the "standard of detriment" which the court must find
before naming adoptive parents the guardians of the child over the
interests of a natural parent, the arena of temporary letters of guard-
ianship employs the standard of "good cause," and is often before the
courts in emergency cases. 147
There are few cases which interpret "good cause." In Dority v. Su-
perior Court148 the trial court, over the infant's parents' objection,
appointed the director of the Department of Public Social Services as
the temporary guardian of the child who was medically diagnosed as
being "brain dead". The purpose of the appointment was to enable
the director to vicariously assert the child's constitutional right to re-
fuse medical treatment and withdraw life-support devices.
The appointment of a temporary guardian in Dority was made pur-
suant to California Probate Code section 2250, which provides that a
temporary guardian may be appointed for good cause or other show-
ing.149 Good cause was shown when the court found the state had a
compelling interest in providing care for the child.150 The court
stated it need find only that there is a "potential" threat to the
145. See In re Cox, 58 Cal. 3d 434, 24 Cal. Rptr. 864 (1962) (child should stay with
adoptive parents during hearing); Smith v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. App. 3d 109, 115
Cal. Rptr. 677 (1974) (visitation by natural mother pending appeal not in the best inter-
est of the child); C.V.C. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 909, 106 Cal. Rptr. 123
(1973) (where there is no threat to child, the status quo is preferred).
146. "In dealing with problems of physical custody pending the resolution of adop-
tion litigation, the courts normally call for the preservation of the status quo when it
poses no threat to the child.... The courts assume that the agency will not make
unnecessary changes in custody " C.V.C, 29 Cal. App. 3d at 920-21, 106 Cal. Rptr. at
131.
147. Pursuant to California Probate Code section 2250, the court, on "good cause",
may order that temporary letters of guardianship be issued. They must show a specific
date of termination which, as a rule, will be the date set for hearing on the general
guardianship.
Temporary guardianship letters empower the guardian with the same authority as
general letters, unless specified otherwise in the order to issue the letters. CAL. PROB.
CODE § 2252 (West 1981).
148. 145 Cal. App. 3d 273, 193 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1983).
149. "The petition shall state facts which establish good cause for appointment of
the temporary guardian or temporary conservator." CAL. PROB. CODE § 2250(d) (West
Supp. 1991).
150. The Dority court stated:
The state has a substantial interest in protecting and providing for the child's
care when the parents represent a potential threat to the child's well-being or
where the parents, for some reason, become unavailable. Investigations reveal
that the parents in this case may have been responsible for the child's inju-
ries.... Parents, by their own action, can become legally unavailable and un-
able to provide the proper care for their child.
Dority, 145 Cal. App. 3d at 278, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 291.
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child's well-being before good cause is shown. There need not be a
showing of actual abuse.151
The purpose in seeking temporary guardianship for adoptive par-
ents pending a guardianship hearing is to keep the child with the
adoptive parents and avoid interim changes of custody of the child.
Such interim changes may be unnecessary if the court aniticpates
finding that it would be detrimental for the child to be in the biologi-
cal parent's custody. The state has recognized that interim changes
in custody are detrimental to children.152 In considering whether
"good cause" may be found, the courts should be cognizant of the ef-
fects of changes in custody pending a guardianship hearing which
may be only thirty to sixty days in the future.
It is fundamental that in considering the effects of custody change
and visitation orders, a court must be extremely sensitive to avoid ad-
verse effects on the child. Both the California Supreme Court and
courts of appeal have recognized that a court should carefully con-
sider, before any changes are ordered, the effects that changes in en-
vironment have on children who are subjects of adoption
proceedings.5 3 The Court must act with regard to the best interest
and safety of the infant.
Courts are recognizing the serious harmful effects which are likely
to follow the uprooting of a child. In In re Rose Lynn G., the court
said:
An important element that a trial court must consider, when making a deci-
sion about children, is the impact of the passage of time. Childhood is short;
many basic attitudes and capacities are developed in the very early years. Ties
are formed to the adults present in the child's life, and can only be broken by
inviting emotional disaster.1 5 4
In other cases, the courts have recognized the importance of con-
tinuity in a child's life and rejected moving a child.15s Courts are re-
luctant to unnecessarily transplant a child and subject the child to
the trauma of separation. 56 Sudden upheaval in a child's life may
151. Although the parents had been held to answer on charges of child neglect and
abuse, they had not been convicted nor had it been unequivocally shown that they ac-
tually committed the abuse. Id at 278-79, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 291.
152. See supra notes 143-44.
153. See In re Cox, 58 Cal. 2d 434, 24 Cal. Rptr. 864 (1962) (best interests are served
by maintaining child's status quo during appeal); C.V.C. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal App.
3d 909, 106 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1973). See supra note 144.
154. 57 Cal. App. 3d 408, 425, 129 Cal. Rptr. 338, 350 (1976).
155. In In re Michelle T., 44 Cal. App. 3d 699, 706-08, 117 Cal. Rptr. 856, 859-60
(1975), the court rejected removal of the child from the petitioners because of the
trauma likely to be caused by removal from a stable environment. See supra note 102.
156. See supra notes 101-02.
have a long term impact on the child's ability to form relationships
because of the fear of loss.15 7
The problem of uprooting children is also discussed by Professor
Bodenheimer. She notes that "'[t]here has been a persistent ten-
dency on the part of courts to assume that children, being young and
malleable, can adapt to change more readily than adults.' "158 But
Professor Bodenheimer points out that, in fact, the opposite is true.
Children are actually more sensitive to change and more likely to be
harmed by upheaval from a secure home.159
Generally, it is in the best interests of the child to deny a parent
the ability to withdraw consent to an adoption "once the child has be-
come settled in the adoptive home."'160 Currently, California allows
the withdrawal of consent only after a hearing and only with court
approval. Courts generally agree that the welfare of the child should
take precedence over the statutory rights of the natural parent.16 1
The nature of these cases is such that emotional factors favoring
either the biological parent or the adopting parents are always pres-
ent and pose an obstacle to properly analyzing the case from the per-
spective of the child. In order to analyze this question, a number of
factors must be considered. The court, of course, has a great deal of
discretion, not only in determining what these various factors should
be, but also in weighing the effect of each factor. Factors such as
comparative wealth and parental preference clearly have no place in
the best interests analysis.
157. See Inker, supra note 102.
158. Bodenheimer, supra note 104, at 19 (quoting Note, Natural v. Adoptive Par-
ents: Divided 0hildren and the Wisdom of Solomon, 57 IOWA L. REV. 171, 174 (1971)).
159. See supra note 104.
160.
Once consent to the adoption has been given, California law, unlike the law of
some jurisdictions, generally protects the child's interest in remaining in an
adoptive home that has become its real home.... In an independent adoption,
consent may be withdrawn only with court approval after a hearing. The
court may permit withdrawal of the consent and return of the child to his nat-
ural parents only if, under all the circumstances, withdrawal is reasonable and
in the best interests of the child. Since this provision gives no specific guide-
lines to the courts, it is recommended that language be added to the effect
that withdrawal of consent by a parent should, as a rule, be denied once the
child has become settled in the adoptive home.
Bodenheimer, supra note 104, at 34.
161. In re Barnett, 54 Cal. 2d 370, 354 P.2d 18, 6 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1960), held that:
"The rule of strict construction of our adoption statutes in favor of the natural par-
ents..., being inconsistent with the decisions of this court... as well as with Civil Code
§ 4, is disapproved." Id. at 378, 354 P.2d at 22-23, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 566 (citations omitted).
The court in In re Robinson, 48 Cal. App. 3d 244, 121 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1975), stated
that: "The requirement of consent by a natural parent is not strictly construed in favor
of the rights of the natural parent, but instead is liberally construed in order to effect
the object of the adoption statue in promoting the welfare of the children." Id. at 248,
121 Cal. Rptr. at 577 (citing San Diego County Dep't of Public Welfare v. Superior
Court, 7 Cal. 3d 1, 101 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1972)) (emphasis added).
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Michigan's Child Custody Act enumerates factors that form a good
framework for analyzing the best interests of the child. Following is
an excerpt of the considerations that Michigan believes lead to a deci-
sion that is in the best interests of the child:
(a) The love, affection and other emotional ties existing among
the competing parties and the child,
(b) The capacity and disposition of competing parties to give the
child love, affection, and guidance, and continuation of the educating
and rearing of the child in its religion or creed, if any,
(c) The capacity and disposition of competing parties to provide
the child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care rec-
ognized and permitted under the law in lieu of medical care, and
other material needs,
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a satisfactory, stable
environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity,
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed
custodial home,
(f) The moral fitness of the competing parties,
(g) The mental and physical health of the competing parties,
(h) The home, school, and community record of the child,
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the
child to be of sufficient age to express preference,
(j) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a
particular child custody dispute.16 2
A comparative analysis without the application of any parental
preference is required to decide the best interests of the child. This
analysis must be from the perspective of the child, not from the per-
spective of the contesting adults.163 Further, the analysis must in-
clude consideration of the "trauma" caused by removal from a stable
and established home. 8 4
By far, the most important issue is the detriment that befalls the
162. Child Custody Act of 1970, MICH COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23 (West Supp. 1976).
163. In re Michelle T., 44 Cal. App. 3d 699, 117 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1975).
164. See In re Tachick, 60 Wis. 2d 540, 210 N.W.2d 865, 869-71 (1973). In Williams v.
Neumann, 405 S.W.2d 556 (Ky. App. 1966), the court stated that,
[the petitioners have] attended every baby and childhood need and demand of
[the child] from the fourth day of her life when she could neither focus her
eyes nor raise her head. Up to this hour, according to this record, [she] has
known no other mother as she has never seen her natural mother. She is now
three and one-half years old and talking. She cannot suddenly be
transplanted.
Id at 557.
child when he or she is uprooted from the home and the attachments
to the psychological parents are broken. It is now recognized that
strong attachments form by the age of three months.
The syndrome that follows the disruption is anaclitic depression.
Experts agree that the impact of such a loss will be felt in varying
degrees throughout the individual's life. The symptoms may include
regression of verbal and motor skills, sleep loss, refusal of food, sup-
pression of the immune system, bowel upset, general failure to
thrive, lack of trust, refusal to form new attachments and repeated
respiratory infections.165 The intensity of these symptoms is directly
proportional to the intensity of the reciprocal attachments between
child and parent.166
IX. THE TREND To RECOGNIZE CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
Recent appellate decisions show a trend that appears to be placing
growing emphasis on the rights of children. Since the California
Supreme Court's decision in In re B.G., 167 strict standards have been
imposed on the trial courts before there would be an encroachment
into the parent's right to the custody and control of his or her child.
The decision in In re B.G. made a broad and sweeping application of
California Civil Code section 4600 and the detriment standard set out
in the code. Baby Girl M16 applied the detriment standard in the
putative father cases under California Civil Code sections 7006 and
7017.169
The California Supreme Court then granted hearing in Michael U.
v. Jamie B. 17o The Michael U. v. Jamie B. court was severely divided
with three justices in the majority of five urging reversal of Baby
Girl M and a return to the best interests of the child standard. The
1986 legislature followed the court's recommendation by passing the
amendment to sections 7006 and 7017.171 That amendment affords
the putative father the opportunity to prove that awarding custody to
him rather than the adoptive couple would serve the best interests of
the child; otherwise, his consent to the adoption is not required.
Thus, the legislature has dispensed with the detriment standard and
shifted the burden of proof to the putative father. 72
165. Call, Helping Infants Cope with Ctange, 3 EARLY CHILD DEV. CARE 229, 230
(1974).
166. See generally GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, supra note 103.
167. 11 Cal. 3d 679, 523 P.2d 244, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974).
168. 37 Cal. 3d 65, 688 P.2d 918, 207 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1984).
169. See supra notes 31-41 and accompanying text.
170. 39 Cal. 3d 787, 705 P.2d 362, 218 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1985).
171. 1986 Cal. Stat. 1370, 1408.
172. In an action under CAL. CIV. CODE § 224 (West 1982), to dispense with a mari-
tal father's rights, the court in In re Christopher S., 197 Cal. App. 3d 433, 242 Cal. Rptr.
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X. ADOPTIVE PARENT'S RIGHTS
Adoptive parent's rights are also gaining recognition. Adoptive
parents have a constitutionally protected right to a hearing before a
child can be removed from their custody.173 Further, California
courts are supporting finality in adoption actions and disapproving
appeals that postpone finality.174
Justice Friedman wrote a perceptive statement that gives insight
into the emotions and feelings that make these cases the most diffi-
cult of all to handle:
In determining whether a status of rights is fundamental, the courts consider
its effect in human terms and its importance to the individual's life situation.
Gain of a child for adoption fulfills the prospective parents' most cherished
hopes. The event marks the onset of a close and meaningful relationship.
The emotional investment does not await the ultimate decree of adoption.
Love and mutual dependence set in ahead of official cachets, administrative or
judicial. The placement initiates the "closest conceivable counterpart of the
relationship of parent and child." To characterize enforced removal of the
child as a "grievous loss" is to state the obvious.
The governmental interest is weighty. The statutory system for relinquish-
ment to the agency, for agency placement and agency approval, bespeaks a
state policy to promote the child's welfare in derogation of all other values.1 7 5
Although the notion that "blood is thicker than water" is still prev-
alent, it is clear today that biological relationship should not and can-
not, in the interests of the child, take precedence over the bond
formed between a child and psychological parents.176
866 (1987), held that the best interests of the child was the appropriate standard, and a
finding of detriment was not required.
The decision of In re E.G., making the broad application of both section 4600 and the
detriment standard, was challenged as well in In re B.J.B., 185 Cal. App. 3d 1201, 230
Cal. Rptr. 332 (1986).
173. Jinny N. v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. App. 3d 967, 971, 241 Cal. Rptr. 95, 97
(1987), held that the agency violated the expectancy of a prospective adoptive mother
when the agency intervened and the court granted a motion to dismiss. See also
Christina K. v. Superior Court, 184 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 229 Cal. Rptr. 564 (1986).
174. The California Supreme Court in In re Alexander S., 44 Cal. 3d 857, 750 P.2d
778, 245 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988),ruled that a final non-modifiable judgment in an adoption
related action cannot be attacked by habeas corpus. The unanimous court rested its
opinion on "sound public policy" that requires finality in child custody cases. Id, at
868, 750 P.2d at 784, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 7. The court in In re Micah S., 198 Cal. App. 3d
557, 243 Cal. Rptr. 756 (1988), likewise urged finality in adoption cases. The concurring
opinion by Justice Brauer renders a scathing indictment of the appellate process
wherein appointed counsel brings appeals that lack substance and delay finality. Id. at
564-68, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 760-63.
175. C.V.C. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 909, 916, 106 Cal. Rptr. 123, 128
(1973).
176. Is [biological parenthood] more natural or more important than the mu-
tual, reciprocal and continuous relation between parent and child, which may
occur in adoptive or non-adoptive families involved in the rearing of a child
The litigants in these cases, be they biological or adoptive parents,
facing such a grievous loss, their emotional as well as financial re-
sources taxed to the point of depletion, are going through a hell all
their own. To sit in fair judgment of these competing interests takes
an extraordinary jurist, with a cast iron constitution, the wisdom of
Solomon, and the heart of a parent.
from infancy to maturity with all of the impact of day-to-day care and up-
bringing upon character, psychology, outlook, emotional make-up, and even
biology which that entails? In this sense, does not nature "do the work of na-
ture" and create one a child who by nature is a stranger? In fact, in this
sense, does not nature do the work of nature and create one a child who is not
a stranger?
Id. (citing TenBroek, California's Adoption Law and Programs, 6 HASTINGS L.J. 261,
276 (1955)).
